[crvUSD]: GHO Pegkeeper Review

Proposals
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⁠⁠Summary

This proposal adds the GHO/crvUSD pool 0x635EF0056A597D13863B73825CcA297236578595 to the crvUSD PegKeeper set, with an initial 3,000,000 crvUSD debt ceiling. The goal is to diversify PegKeeper counterparties while keeping initial exposure conservative, given the pool’s current depth, and to enable a monitored, staged ramp-up as liquidity matures.

This proposal is based on the accompanying Pegkeeper Onboarding Review: Aave’s GHO, co-authored by TokenLogic and LlamaRisk.

Motivation

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Why GHO?

  • Meaningful on-chain peg infrastructure: GHO’s Stability Module (GSM) provides a strong on-chain conversion rail (USDC/USDT ↔ GHO) and has historically supported tight peg behavior within a relatively stable band.
  • Diversification of PegKeeper basket: Adding GHO expands the PegKeeper set beyond the existing mix (USDC/USDT/PYUSD/frxUSD), improving resilience to idiosyncratic risks.

Why conservative sizing?

  • The GHO/crvUSD pool is currently small relative to incumbent PegKeeper pools (per the report), so a small ceiling is appropriate to avoid PegKeeper actions becoming prone to noise.

Proposed Parameters

Initial debt ceiling: 3,000,000 crvUSD

Ramping principle (non-binding guidance for future votes):

  • Consider increasing to 10–15m only once the GHO/crvUSD pool sustains a meaningful share of total PegKeeper TVL (e.g., low-single-digit %, ~5% heuristic of overall pegkeeper), with stable execution quality.
  • Consider ceilings >15m only if system-level peg assurance remains strong, with explicit attention to GSM depth/usability and governance changes that could widen effective redemption bands.

Risk Considerations (summarized)

Key risks are not “tail depeg” style historically, but rather:

  • Structural peg width: GHO can trade in a modestly wider “normal band” than the tightest assets (e.g., USDC). This is acceptable if exposure is sized appropriately and PegKeeper safeguards remain active.
  • Pool depth/reflexivity risk: If PegKeeper debt is large relative to pool depth, the PegKeeper can become the dominant flow, increasing slippage and potentially amplifying short-term deviations.
  • Governance/parameter risk: GSM fees/caps and broader governance decisions can affect effective arbitrage bounds and liquidity.

Mitigants:

  • Curve’s PegKeeper Regulator can effectively halt PegKeeper action by setting allowed amounts to zero if checks fail.
  • Starting with 3m keeps the worst-case impact bounded while the pool grows.

Disclaimer

TokenLogic and LlamaRisk are both service providers to Aave. Neither have been commissioned or compensated specifically for producing this report. This proposal and the underlying report are provided for informational purposes and should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or other professional advice.

1 Like
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A GHO PegKeeper and price adapter were deployed:
Pegkeeper: https://etherscan.io/address/0x53876b157decf04389eed66c7c29d73863f8c50b
Adapter: https://etherscan.io/address/0x697fc22314e736056eb0ad7150167ccc9d3396db

Vote has been initiated with payload:

POOL_NG_PROXY = "0x697fc22314e736056eb0ad7150167ccc9d3396db"
PK = "0x53876b157decf04389eed66c7c29d73863f8c50b"
FACTORY = "0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC"
REGULATOR = "0x36a04CAffc681fa179558B2Aaba30395CDdd855f"
OWNER_PROXY = "0xb7400D2EA0f6DC1d7b153aA430B9E572F28afB79"

debt_ceiling = 3_000_000 * 10 ** 18

MONETARY_POLICIES = [
    "0x07491D124ddB3Ef59a8938fCB3EE50F9FA0b9251",  # single MonPol
]

AGGREGATE_ORACLES = [
    "0x18672b1b0c623a30089A280Ed9256379fb0E4E62",
]

factory = Contract(FACTORY)
pk = web3.toChecksumAddress(PK)
contract = web3.eth.contract(address=FACTORY, abi=factory.abi)
calldata = contract.encodeABI("set_debt_ceiling",[pk, debt_ceiling])

ACTIONS = [
    (OWNER_PROXY, "execute", FACTORY, calldata),
    (REGULATOR, "add_peg_keepers", [PK]),
    *[(m_policy, "add_peg_keeper", PK) for m_policy in MONETARY_POLICIES],
    *[(oracle, "add_price_pair", POOL_NG_PROXY) for oracle in AGGREGATE_ORACLES],
]

Vote here:

3

As I see GHO is worse at keeping peg than other PegKeeper coins(and even crvUSD before the latest volatility). As for the risks it is pegged to USDC/USDT – exposure that we already have. Moreover it brings additional risks related to CDPs on Aave(remember that core service providers just left Aave DAO). So what are the reasons for such integration?

  • Is there natural demand for GHO<>crvUSD routes?
  • Will GHO deploy its’ own PegKeeper? Why should crvUSD take GHO’s risks while GHO doesn’t?
1 Like
4

The goal of this proposal is to diversify peg stabilization routes and expand crvUSD liquidity capacity in a controlled way to meet increased crvUSD flows with the introduction of YB.

On peg performance: it is true that historically crvUSD maintained a tighter peg than GHO. However, the context today is different. YB introduced temporary displacement flows of crvUSD. So, ensuring sufficient liquidity pathways becomes increasingly important, and GHO can provide this stability.

Regarding Aave governance: the statement that “remember that core service providers just left Aave DAO” is not relevant in the context of GHO. TokenLogic has always been responsible for monitoring GHO’s peg dynamics and tuning the relevant parameters, and this has not changed. As for Aave CDP markets, risk management of those has been done by Chaos Labs and LlamaRisk, which has also not changed.

Even though GHO references USDC/USDT liquidity in GSMs, its minting dynamics and market structure are independent, and the GSMs currently hold >250M in USDT/USDC/USDT0, up from 138.8M in underlying stablecoins across USDC and USDT at the time of the report publication. This means its stabilization capacity for crvUSD is similar, but does not simply duplicate existing exposure.

The proposal is intentionally conservative. The PegKeeper ceiling is small and designed to allow us to observe real market behaviour before considering any expansion. This allows us to see if the GHO ↔ crvUSD route gains more natural demand and how the pair behaves across market conditions.

The argument “Why should crvUSD take GHO’s risks while GHO doesn’t?” is inconsistent with the expectations from PegKeeper asset issuers. None of the other PegKeeper assets take reciprocal risk either. It is, however, the case that Aave can offer good partnership opportunities with Curve, and we are certainly investigating any potential cross-integrations that can benefit Curve.

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Adding this for additional context:

gsm-snapshot
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Source: Aave Analytics