Welcome, and thanks for leading with the measurements instead of the pitch — the reconstructed per-market worst-days are exactly the kind of thing this scope has been missing.
One finding deserves to be pulled out of the appendix and put in front of the DAO, because it reframes the whole mandate: your number that Llamalend v1 has cost suppliers roughly $11.6M while returning the DAO $0, with about $10.6M of that realized in the 2024 CRV-market episodes. That isn’t a monitoring input — it’s a standing, unresolved liability that predates whoever wins this mandate.
Which raises a scoping question worth settling now, before the award rather than after: does Scope 2 cover the bad debt that already exists in wound-down markets — measuring it, tracking it, and recommending how it gets resolved — or only forward-looking risk on active and new markets?
The CFP language (“minimize preventable losses, bad debt, and market impairment”) reads forward-looking. But the largest realized losses aren’t in the markets you’d be monitoring going forward; they’re sitting in markets that are already deprecated with no working exit. CRV-long has had maxWithdraw at zero for months. The WFRAX case (Proposal to Compensate for the WFRAX Market's Bad Debt.) has been dormant since March. If the incoming provider’s remit stops at “don’t create new bad debt,” the existing bad debt has no owner at all — which is how these things quietly stall.
There are already mechanisms on the forum record that a risk mandate could evaluate rather than invent: the DAO providing recovery-pool liquidity as an LP rather than a grant (CRV-long LlamaLend market recovery - #18 by strky), a standing rule routing a capped share of already-collected fees into recovery pools (LlamaLend v1 Market Deprecation Plan - #2 by strky), and the capped-emission repayment the DAO actually executed for sDOLA-long2 (sDOLA-long2 Repayment Funds Source Proposal). A team that measured the $11.6M is well placed to say which of these is defensible per market, and at what size.
Even a clear “that’s a DAO execution decision, outside monitoring scope” is a useful answer — it tells the DAO the resolution of existing losses needs an owner this mandate won’t supply. Better to have that on the record now than to discover it in month two.
Either way — useful work, and good to have another set of eyes rebuilding these markets from the chain.