Thanks @LlamaRisk for the deprecation plan. One line is worth a separate look: the note that per-market remediation “may be handled as a separate workstream.” That workstream fits better as one standing framework — a permanent rule rather than a separate vote per market — than as eleven votes.
The eleven markets together. The plan identifies eleven bad-debt markets with about $1.22M aggregate shortfall across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Fraxtal, and Optimism: CRV-long, sDOLA-long2, UwU, wstUSR, IBTC, ARB-long2, FXN, FXS/FRAX, SQUID, OP, Optimism CRV. Triggers vary — soft-liquidation parameters, oracle design, and other Curve-shipped factors played roles in different cases. The outcome is structurally similar: funds stuck in lending markets that have been wound down, with no working exit.
What the per-case path has produced. The clearest data point is the Fraxtal FXS/FRAX market, $145,857 of bad debt. A compensation proposal landed on 15 March 2026 at /t/11021. One reply on 16 March, silent since. An on-chain audit through 22 April 2026 found no vote, no calldata, no execution; checking Aragon Ownership votes #1396–#1405 through 8 May 2026 also turns up no WFRAX action. Eight weeks plus dormant. That is the realistic baseline for “per-case” at cohort scale — most cases will not be written, and most of those written will not be voted.
The mechanism is operational. The plan names Egorov’s recovery-pool design at /t/11062 as “a candidate for illiquid bad-debt markets in particular.” Vote #1400 deployed the CRV-long recovery pool on 30 April 2026. Gauge weight activated at 0.45% on the epoch starting 7 May 2026. Pool depth has grown from a few hundred dollars at thread-open to over $160K today, and CRV emissions are flowing. What is missing for the broader cohort is a decision on how to distribute the funding, not a redesigned mechanism.
The proposal — one standing framework. Apply the recovery-pool template to every bad-debt market in the cohort: deploy where missing, reuse where it exists. A fixed share of DAO admin and L2 fees auto-routes to those pools. The DAO holds the LP — an investment on the DAO’s balance sheet, not money sent to anyone. Half of swap fees flow back to the DAO over time. Trapped holders self-pace their exit: take a deeper discount early, or wait as depth fills toward par. The split across markets follows an objective rule — choice between bad-debt size, impacted-user count, or per-market floor-plus-cap is the design question below.
Why one rule rather than eleven votes. It works the same regardless of cause: oracle exploit, market drift, or parameter mismatch all produce the same outcome for trapped users. It is capped: a ceiling per market and a stop condition once enough depth is reached. It is paced naturally as fees accrue, not a one-shot allocation — which lines up with michwill’s view that this should happen “over time” and out of incremental DAO earnings. And it avoids running eleven separate proposals, most of which would track the WFRAX outcome.
Two open design questions. What share of DAO admin and L2 fees is sustainable as ongoing routing — given the funding-source picture documented in /t/11069? And how should the flow split across markets — by bad-debt size, by impacted-user count, or by a per-market floor-plus-cap that prevents one large market from absorbing early routing?
Happy to draft the calldata and a sizing model if there is interest.