Would crvUSD borrowers pay to cap future acquisition cost?

We are testing whether existing crvUSD borrowers need a paid right to acquire a fixed quantity against a fixed USDC strike during a defined window.

Three findings:

  • One tested Yield Basis withdrawal composition returned less WBTC and consumed more gas than native withdrawal. We discarded that composition for the sampled case.
  • A covered option delivered 25,000 crvUSD against 25,000 USDC in a local fork using deployed USDC, after a hypothetical 100 USDC premium. This is a familiar mechanism, not demonstrated demand. A direct spot execution from the same origin block cost 25,004.463706 USDC: 95.536294 less than premium plus strike, before gas valuation.
  • Seven evenly spaced blocks, preregistered from a published 2024 incident window before querying quotes, showed a different situation. At block 20,080,216 (13 June, 03:27:11 UTC), this USDC/crvUSD pool quoted 27,485.275195 USDC for 25,000 crvUSD. Its one-million quote reverted with insufficient accounted crvUSD reserves. These are pool-specific quotes including price impact, not marginal prices or executions. They establish neither a fair premium nor a current 2026 shortage.

DeFi Saver already supports collateral-funded repayment and flash-loan closing; maintaining one’s own reserve is another baseline. An option would still require strike funding and transferable assets.

For a position you operate, could premium plus strike improve on those alternatives? What quantity, deadline, funding constraint and maximum premium would make it useful? We still need actual-position comparisons and provider pricing: a cheap premium can benefit the buyer while underpaying the provider. No willingness to pay has been established.

Sources: LlamaRisk incident report · DeFi Saver workflows.