# Proposal to Recompensate Borrowers Liquidated in the sDOLA-long2 LlamaLend Market

**URL:** <http://gov.curve.finance/t/proposal-to-recompensate-borrowers-liquidated-in-the-sdola-long2-llamalend-market/11029>\
**Category:** Proposals\
**Created:** [March 23, 2026, 2:42pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/proposal-to-recompensate-borrowers-liquidated-in-the-sdola-long2-llamalend-market/11029 "2026-03-23T14:42:12Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 10

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**Author:** ![strky](http://gov.curve.finance/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/s/c6cbf5/32.png) [@strky](http://gov.curve.finance/u/strky)\
**Post date:** [May 7, 2026, 5:27pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/proposal-to-recompensate-borrowers-liquidated-in-the-sdola-long2-llamalend-market/11029/10 "2026-05-07T17:27:00Z")

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Thanks @midinio for the direct response — appreciate the willingness to engage on the framing question.

Three observations on the cases-must-stay-separate position. Each is anchored in your own follow-up thread or in primary on-chain data, not in the merits of either case in isolation.

**First — the funding-source picture has shifted in this thread already.** Your March 23 OP proposed `DAO treasury / Community Fund` as the source, citing the WFRAX and Vyper precedents. The follow-up [funding-source proposal from @LlamaRisk on /t/11069](https://gov.curve.finance/t/sdola-long2-repayment-funds-source-proposal/11069), in its own Appendix B, documents the Treasury at ~14,278 crvUSD (post Proposal #1381) and the Community Fund at 0 crvUSD — both insufficient. The four-step uncollected-L2-fees workaround in that proposal exists precisely because those simpler paths are closed. Two months in, the empirical question is no longer whether $822K is “very feasible to compensate” in the abstract. It is whether the one viable source the DAO has identified should fund one LlamaLend market and not another.

**Second — the consistency standard cuts both ways.** @0xSEM has already raised this on /t/11069. The June 2024 sUSDe compensation proposal, [Vote #845](https://www.curve.finance/dao/ethereum/proposals/845-ownership), was rejected on-chain 83.17% NO (410.2M veCRV nay vs 83.0M yea, quorum 10.23% against a 30% minimum). His framing applies symmetrically: either the 2024 standard holds, or there is a materially-different basis. The [@LlamaRisk post-mortem](https://gov.curve.finance/t/sdola-long2-repayment-funds-source-proposal/11069) on the present case documents two of the four enabling factors as Curve-shipped — permissionless `exchange()` on LLAMMA and the absence of EMA smoothing on `convertToAssets()` reads in the oracle wrapper. That is the same protocol-design class as the soft-liquidation parameters and bad-debt resolution path in the CRV-long market.

**Third — and this is the question I would genuinely like the principled answer to.** The 27-borrowers framing is technically accurate. Empirically, the top four addresses in your Appendix A account for ~85% of the $822K loss; the long-tail addresses lost amounts measured in single-digit dollars or cents. If the underlying principle of /t/11069 is restitution-by-protocol-fault, would you support the same uncollected-fees source funding (a) sDOLA-long2 in full and (b) pro-rata recovery for affected depositors of the [CRV-long LlamaLend market](https://gov.curve.finance/t/crv-long-llamalend-market-recovery/11062), where the cause class overlaps and the loss is comparable in USD scale?

If not — what principled basis distinguishes them, given that the previous borrower-comp attempt under the same DAO was rejected and the only viable source today is, by construction, shared revenue?

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_[View the full topic](http://gov.curve.finance/t/proposal-to-recompensate-borrowers-liquidated-in-the-sdola-long2-llamalend-market/11029)._