Thanks @midinio for the direct response — appreciate the willingness to engage on the framing question.
Three observations on the cases-must-stay-separate position. Each is anchored in your own follow-up thread or in primary on-chain data, not in the merits of either case in isolation.
First — the funding-source picture has shifted in this thread already. Your March 23 OP proposed DAO treasury / Community Fund as the source, citing the WFRAX and Vyper precedents. The follow-up funding-source proposal from @LlamaRisk on /t/11069, in its own Appendix B, documents the Treasury at ~14,278 crvUSD (post Proposal #1381) and the Community Fund at 0 crvUSD — both insufficient. The four-step uncollected-L2-fees workaround in that proposal exists precisely because those simpler paths are closed. Two months in, the empirical question is no longer whether $822K is “very feasible to compensate” in the abstract. It is whether the one viable source the DAO has identified should fund one LlamaLend market and not another.
Second — the consistency standard cuts both ways. @0xSEM has already raised this on /t/11069. The June 2024 sUSDe compensation proposal, Vote #845, was rejected on-chain 83.17% NO (410.2M veCRV nay vs 83.0M yea, quorum 10.23% against a 30% minimum). His framing applies symmetrically: either the 2024 standard holds, or there is a materially-different basis. The @LlamaRisk post-mortem on the present case documents two of the four enabling factors as Curve-shipped — permissionless exchange() on LLAMMA and the absence of EMA smoothing on convertToAssets() reads in the oracle wrapper. That is the same protocol-design class as the soft-liquidation parameters and bad-debt resolution path in the CRV-long market.
Third — and this is the question I would genuinely like the principled answer to. The 27-borrowers framing is technically accurate. Empirically, the top four addresses in your Appendix A account for ~85% of the $822K loss; the long-tail addresses lost amounts measured in single-digit dollars or cents. If the underlying principle of /t/11069 is restitution-by-protocol-fault, would you support the same uncollected-fees source funding (a) sDOLA-long2 in full and (b) pro-rata recovery for affected depositors of the CRV-long LlamaLend market, where the cause class overlaps and the loss is comparable in USD scale?
If not — what principled basis distinguishes them, given that the previous borrower-comp attempt under the same DAO was rejected and the only viable source today is, by construction, shared revenue?