# Emergency DAO Proxy Upgrade **URL:** \ **Category:** Proposals\ **Created:** [October 19, 2026, 5:42pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/emergency-dao-proxy-upgrade/11193 "2026-10-19T17:42:44Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 2\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![yrisk](http://gov.curve.finance/user_avatar/gov.curve.finance/yrisk/32/2631_2.png) [@yrisk](http://gov.curve.finance/u/yrisk)\ **Post date:** [October 19, 2026, 5:42pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/emergency-dao-proxy-upgrade/11193/1 "2026-10-19T17:42:44Z")
## **Summary** yRisk recommends this migration as part of its risk mandate. It extends Curve’s Emergency DAO (eDAO) coverage to LLv2 and selected AMM factories, narrows some LLv1 powers, and adds targeted emergency calls. This is not the final set of eDAO permissions. Further updates may follow as Curve expands to new chains. ## **Motivation** Curve’s current eDAO proxies predate LLv2, leaving eDAO without direct access to its policy, cap, admin, and deployment controls during an emergency. The new proxies add these controls while the Curve DAO retains full admin control through `execute`. ## **Specification** On Ethereum: - Deploy one immutable proxy for LLv1/crvUSD, LLv2 and the LM Callback factory. - Deploy one immutable proxy for Stable-NG, Tricrypto-NG and TwoCrypto-NG. - Transfer admin of the two zkBTC oracles separately. On L2s and sidechains: - Deploy the same lending proxy contract on Optimism for LLv2. - Deploy one child-gauge proxy per eligible chain and make it admin of the DAO-owned factory. | **Permission** | **Proxy** | **Calls** | **Effect** | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **Keep:** Existing permissions | AMM Lending | `emergency_parameters` `set_callback`, `set_monetary_policy`, `reduce_debt_ceiling`, `remove_emergency` | No change | | **Remove:** LLv1 fee setters | Lending | `set_amm_fee`, `set_admin_fee` | eDAO loses these calls | | **Narrow:** LLv1 discounts | Lending | `set_borrowing_discounts` → `increase_loan_discount` | Loan discount can be raised only; no access to liquidation discount | | **Add:** LLv2 policy and callback | Lending | `set_v2_monetary_policy`, `set_v2_callback` | Replace policy or callback | | **Add:** LLv2 exposure controls | Lending | `increase_v2_loan_discount`, `set_v2_borrow_cap_zero`, `set_v2_max_supply_zero`, `remove_v2_custom_admin` | Raise discount, zero limits, or remove custom admin | | **Add:** LLv2 oracle repair | Lending | `set_v2_price_oracle` | Replace an oracle that reverts | | **Add:** Deployment pauses | Lending | `pause` | Pause new markets or callbacks | | **Add:** Oracle failover | Lending | `set_use_chainlink` | Toggle Chainlink oracle paths | | **Add:** Gauge manager | AMM Lending L2 child gauge | `set_gauge_manager` | Reassign reward manager; Tricrypto-NG gauges have no manager setter | | **Add:** Gauge kill | AMM Lending | `set_killed` | Kill Stable-NG, Tricrypto-NG, TwoCrypto-NG, LLv1 and LLv2 gauges; `True` only | | **Keep / add:** eDAO revocation | All proxies | `remove_emergency` | Existing on mainnet lending; added elsewhere | In some cases, the proxies constrain the underlying function: - `set_killed`: always `True`. - `set_v2_borrow_cap_zero`, `set_v2_max_supply_zero`: underlying limits fixed to `0`. - `remove_v2_custom_admin`: underlying admin fixed to the zero address. - `increase_loan_discount`, `increase_v2_loan_discount`: only raise the loan discount; liquidation discount unchanged. - `set_v2_price_oracle`: current oracle fails a bounded `price()` or `price_w()` probe; replacement returns nonzero values. - `reduce_debt_ceiling`: cannot raise the ceiling. ---
**Author:** ![Foreshock](http://gov.curve.finance/user_avatar/gov.curve.finance/foreshock/32/2581_2.png) [@Foreshock](http://gov.curve.finance/u/Foreshock)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 9:49am UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/emergency-dao-proxy-upgrade/11193/2 "2026-10-21T09:49:26Z")
The hardcoded constraints in the last section cover four calls: set\_killed is True only, the cap and supply calls fix the underlying limit at 0, the custom admin calls fix the admin at the zero address, and reduce\_debt\_ceiling cannot raise. Three of the added powers sit outside that list: set\_monetary\_policy, set\_gauge\_manager and set\_use\_chainlink. set\_use\_chainlink is the one worth pinning down, because the table describes it as a toggle rather than a one way action. Zeroing a cap or killing a gauge stops activity, and a wrong call there is bounded and visible. Switching which path prices collateral moves the liquidation point for every open position in that market, and a toggle moves it in both directions. Two things the specification could settle before this goes to a vote: 1. Is set\_use\_chainlink intended to be one way, like set\_killed, with the return path reserved to the DAO through execute? As the table reads, the eDAO holds both directions, so the oracle path for those markets becomes an eDAO decision rather than a DAO one. 2. Which addresses receive admin of the two zkBTC oracles, and does that admin sit inside one of the new immutable proxies or stay held directly?