# Disable Chainlink limits for price oracles in crvUSD **URL:** \ **Category:** Proposals\ **Created:** [August 19, 2023, 3:26pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/disable-chainlink-limits-for-price-oracles-in-crvusd/9527 "2023-08-19T15:26:57Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 10
**Author:** ![michwill](http://gov.curve.finance/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/8e8cbc/32.png) [@michwill](http://gov.curve.finance/u/michwill)\ **Post date:** [August 21, 2023, 10:45pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/disable-chainlink-limits-for-price-oracles-in-crvusd/9527/10 "2023-08-21T22:45:49Z")
Little update. Dynamic fees make losses really really small if one spike in price oracle is created, and then EMA makes it decay. Basically, if 4 (!) blocks in a row get taken over by a malicious MEV manipulator to pump the price oracle, loss comes down to 0.6% at N=50 (while Chainlink-induced loss was 1.5% at maximum!). This manipulation is not feasible (even producing 3 blocks in a row by manipulator is a bit questionable). To make it worse for the attacker - dynamic fee works in such a way that profit from this manipulation (which is expensive) will be taken NOT by the manipulator. ![manipulation-loss](https://gov.curve.finance/uploads/default/original/2X/1/170b66d67a7909913a019a32c367d4be33d0193c.png) Conclusion: in this particular case, EMA oracles look safer than even non-manipulatable unfiltered spot prices --- _[View the full topic](http://gov.curve.finance/t/disable-chainlink-limits-for-price-oracles-in-crvusd/9527)._