# Curve Grant compensation for affected users of the June 12th crvUSD de-peg incident

**URL:** <http://gov.curve.finance/t/curve-grant-compensation-for-affected-users-of-the-june-12th-crvusd-de-peg-incident/10182>\
**Category:** Proposals\
**Created:** [July 14, 2024, 8:47pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/curve-grant-compensation-for-affected-users-of-the-june-12th-crvusd-de-peg-incident/10182 "2024-07-14T20:47:21Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 4

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**Author:** ![0xSEM](http://gov.curve.finance/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/0/9de053/32.png) [@0xSEM](http://gov.curve.finance/u/0xSEM)\
**Post date:** [September 18, 2024, 3:25am UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/curve-grant-compensation-for-affected-users-of-the-june-12th-crvusd-de-peg-incident/10182/4 "2024-09-18T03:25:17Z")

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A vote has been created to vest a total of 112,637 CRV ($30,975) over a period of 1 year to all affected address of the crvUSD/sUSDe depegging incident: [CRV Hub](https://crvhub.com/governance/ownership/845)

The VestSplitter contract is used (same as for Curve Vyper hack) for distribution of the vested funds.

Deployment script is available here. Price has been adjusted to the CRV daily high of $0.275.

> **[GitHub - 0xSEM/curve-crvusd-depeg-incident](https://github.com/0xSEM/curve-crvusd-depeg-incident)**
>
> Contribute to 0xSEM/curve-crvusd-depeg-incident development by creating an account on GitHub.

Please refer to the LlamaRisk report for a clear description of the incident: [crvUSD Upward Depeg (June 12, 2024) Incident Report - Llama Risk](https://www.llamarisk.com/research/crvusd-incident-report-20240612)

> Although Curve Lend is a siloed lending market, meaning the risks associated with the markets should be limited to lenders and borrowers in individual markets, this upward depeg of crvUSD affected users in markets other than the CRV-long market. This is because all Curve Lend markets denominate their price against crvUSD rather than USD. The spike in crvUSD price therefore is interpreted by the market as a reduction in the counterparty asset’s price.  
> In some cases, such as the [sUSDe-long market](https://lend.curve.fi/#/ethereum/markets/one-way-market-11/create), there is a reasonable expectation that the counterparty asset (in this case a synthetic USD token staked in Ethena) will keep a relatively stable price, encouraging users to borrow at higher LTV ratios. The recently created sUSDe market was deployed to allow up to 35x leverage on sUSDe, which was advertised by the Curve Twitter account on [June 9](https://x.com/CurveFinance/status/1799817003248857588). Users may have been prepared for the risk that sUSDe may legitimately lose its peg due to restrictions on redemption imposed by its staking mechanic, but likely they were unprepared for the scenario where crvUSD depegs upward, causing the market to interpret their collateral as depegging to the downside. Users in the sUSDe market were inadvertently liquidated during this event. This demonstrated that, in certain scenarios, the siloed markets in Curve Lend, designed to mitigate risks to users, actually have generalized dependencies that may cause knock-on effects between siloed markets.  
> This scenario was not expected behavior, and the failure of the Pegkeeper to regulate the crvUSD supply was ultimately responsible for the depeg. The following section will describe the Pegkeeper design and why it did not perform as expected.

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_[View the full topic](http://gov.curve.finance/t/curve-grant-compensation-for-affected-users-of-the-june-12th-crvusd-de-peg-incident/10182)._