Posting on behalf of affected lenders in the CRV-long market. Three questions, with the liquidity one as the most pressing.
1. Pathway from current pool depth to a depth that’s actually exit-capable
For a lender holding cvcrvUSD today, the pool is the only on-chain exit other than waiting on CRV price recovery. On-chain state as of 2026-04-27:
- Pool total depth ≈ $198 (≈110 crvUSD + ≈88 cvcrvUSD-equivalent)
- 2 LP holders — 76% concentrated in one wallet associated with the pool deployment, the other 24% in a single tester
- ~8 swaps lifetime
- Vote #1400 is what registers the gauge
0xF429AeC1…CBA3in the GaugeController; it goes in at weight=0, so no CRV emissions to attract LPs even after the vote passes - Aggregate underbacking per the OP ≈ $700K across 38 underwater positions (22 non-dust per the chart)
That’s roughly a 3500× gap between the current depth and the size of the problem this pool is meant to absorb. Hubert’s Apr-26 reply made the LP economics explicit (1Y CRV 0.70/0.95 call spread ≈ $0.009 → ~1.26% APR floor before fees), and saintrat noted the mechanism relies on “trapped users willing to sell at a loss”. From a lender’s standpoint the practical questions are:
- What’s the design’s expectation of how the depth gap closes — sponsor commitment, DAO-funded seed, organic discovery, or a follow-on weight-vote that lets vlCVX / Convex incentives draw LPs?
- The OP also mentions keeping admin fees from this pool in cvcrvUSD form rather than auto-converting — effectively the DAO buying back lenders’ bad debt out of swap revenue. Is this intended as a separate Curve DAO proposal (parameter change to FeeCollector / RewardsHandler), or does the existing fee infrastructure already accommodate it passively? At what timeline would lenders see retained-fee flow start to materially affect recovery?
- Without one of those mechanisms activating, what’s the realistic time-to-depth assumed by the design, and what fills the counterparty role in the meantime?
2. Relationship to LlamaRisk’s announced Step 4
LlamaRisk’s post #1 in the next-steps thread (Apr 17) committed to a “Step 4 — repayment plan” for affected lenders. How does this pool exit mechanism interact with that work — substitute, parallel track, or first stage of a coordinated sequence? The two paths read as economically distinct (secondary-market exit at deep discount vs. structured repayment), and lenders would benefit from clarity on which one is the operating plan.
3. Bridge for affected lenders during pool ramp-up
For positions that today read maxWithdraw=0, what is the proposed intermediate step for the period the pool is still building counterparty depth? From a lender’s standpoint hold-and-wait is the implicit fallback — is that the assumption, or is something else expected to fill the gap?
Happy to be pointed elsewhere if any of these are addressed in other posts.