# CRV-long LlamaLend market recovery **URL:** \ **Category:** Proposals\ **Created:** [April 26, 2026, 8:27pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/crv-long-llamalend-market-recovery/11062 "2026-04-26T20:27:18Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 16
**Author:** ![strky](http://gov.curve.finance/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/s/c6cbf5/32.png) [@strky](http://gov.curve.finance/u/strky)\ **Post date:** [April 29, 2026, 3:44pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/crv-long-llamalend-market-recovery/11062/16 "2026-04-29T15:44:10Z")
Curve has compensated its lenders for protocol-level losses before — at least twice. The first was Vote #521 (executed Dec 21 2023, 88.73% YES of cast veCRV) — 71.77M CRV (~$44.5M at vote-time CRV spot) distributed to LPs affected by the Vyper compiler exploit. Mechanism was a VestSplitter contract with 365-day vesting and pro-rata claims, code already in the curvefi org and fully reusable. A sibling Vote #593 followed in Feb 2024, adding another 4.6M CRV. Forum: [https://gov.curve.fi/t/proposal-to-recompensate-lps-affected-by-curve-pool-exploit/9825](https://gov.curve.fi/t/proposal-to-recompensate-lps-affected-by-curve-pool-exploit/9825) Sibling: [https://gov.curve.fi/t/9877](https://gov.curve.fi/t/9877) VestSplitter code: [GitHub - curvefi/vest-split: Split VestingEscrow for multiple users · GitHub](https://github.com/curvefi/vest-split) The second was the June 2024 crvUSD depeg compensation — 112,637 CRV (~$31K) to affected users. Smaller in scale, but the principle is the same: protocol-level losses don’t fall entirely on the user side. Forum: [Curve Grant compensation for affected users of the June 12th crvUSD de-peg incident](https://gov.curve.finance/t/curve-grant-compensation-for-affected-users-of-the-june-12th-crvusd-de-peg-incident/10182) So the question for this thread isn’t whether the DAO has authority to share protocol-level losses with lenders — that’s settled precedent. The question is which structure fits this case. Three templates that have already worked in DeFi: 1. The most recent passing template at Curve is Vote #1297 (executed Dec 29 2025) — 99.50% of cast votes, 80.82% of supply. Structured with explicit vesting parameters and proportionality framing. [Curve.finance](https://classic.curve.finance/dao/proposals/1297-ownership) 2. Inverse Finance DOLA Repayment Program — running since September 2022 (~3.5 years), structured around protocol revenue rather than a one-time grant. Mills #305 (July 2025) eliminated $2.6M via an INV strategic-mint swap; Mills #345 (February 2026) removed the minimum-repay floor. Funding mix: DBR yield + INV swaps + veNFT-collateralized loans. No new token mint, no holder dilution. [Inverse Finance - Proposal Details](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/305) — [Inverse Finance - Proposal Details](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/345) 3. YIP-86, Yearn → Resupply Loan — passed July 2025. $1.13M crvUSD principal at 6% APR, with 100% of Yearn + Convex permastaker revenue (~$31.5K/week = 34.6% of Resupply protocol revenue) committed to repayment until the loan is closed. 4-month off-track trip-wire. Loan disbursed and currently servicing. [YIP-86: Resupply Bad Debt Repayment Loan - Finance - yearn](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-86-resupply-bad-debt-repayment-loan/14516) The point of listing these isn’t to prescribe a specific outcome — it’s that the lender-bears-100% framing skips a class of solutions adjacent DAOs (and Curve itself) have run successfully. There’s also a separate dimension here — independent of the liquidation-mechanism debate. The bad-debt accumulation timeline (October 2025 → April 2026) ran for six months without a front-end disclosure on the deposit page. New lenders deposited capital during that window into a vault with structural impairment already on the books. Lenders accept liquidation-gap risk as part of the lending model — that’s understood and priced in. What’s harder to defend is silent six-month accumulation of impairment without surfacing it where new capital could see it. Scale check: full-protocol Curve DAO revenue runs around $8.6M/yr (DefiLlama 6-month trailing — [https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-finance](https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-finance)). A revenue-linked program at the YIP-86 cadence sits comfortably inside the precedent envelope. The Treasury accumulator at 0x6508eF65b0Bd57eaBD0f1D52685A70433B2d290B (owned by the Ownership Agent) supports the same Agent.execute(retrieveTokenExact(…)) primitive that already ran in Vote #1381 — no new infrastructure required. Happy to share calldata templates and live Treasury balance reads if useful for whoever wants to draft the technical side. --- _[View the full topic](http://gov.curve.finance/t/crv-long-llamalend-market-recovery/11062)._