# CRV Emission efficiency optimization

**URL:** <http://gov.curve.finance/t/crv-emission-efficiency-optimization/10393>\
**Category:** Proposals\
**Created:** [December 7, 2024, 5:26pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/crv-emission-efficiency-optimization/10393 "2024-12-07T17:26:50Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 2\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![0xSEM](http://gov.curve.finance/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/0/9de053/32.png) [@0xSEM](http://gov.curve.finance/u/0xSEM)\
**Post date:** [December 7, 2024, 5:26pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/crv-emission-efficiency-optimization/10393/1 "2024-12-07T17:26:50Z")

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**Summary:**

The discussion centers on optimizing the efficiency of CRV emissions relative to bribes spent, addressing the current inefficiency caused by rapid price increases and a lag increased bribes. The proposal includes creating a DAO-controlled mechanism to capture excess value from emissions, such as a veFunder that bribes its own votes. This could reduce inflation while accumulating DAO-owned CRV. The current system is inefficient, with approximately only ~$2M in bribes against ~$6M in emissions over the current two weeks cycle. By targeting an emission-to-bribe ratio cap (e.g., $1.25 emission per $1 spent), the protocol could capture a part of its own inflation and use it to potentially fund future initiatives like crvUSD incentives.

**Objective:**

Introduce a mechanism to optimize the efficiency of CRV emissions by leveraging existing infrastructure and deploying a Curve DAO-controlled system that captures excess rewards while maintaining external incentives.

**Proposal Details:**

**Creation of the ‘Inflation Reducer veFunder gauge’:**

• Curve DAO will deploy a new **Inflation Reducer** veFunder gauge

• The veFunder gauge will be fully controlled by Curve DAO, ensuring all bribes and rewards cycle back to the protocol.

**Voting Incentives and Efficiency Control:**

• Curve DAO will actively bribe votes for the Inflation Reducer veFunder using $CRV on platforms like Votemarket and Votium.

• Bribes will be adjusted on a bi-weekly basis to maintain a sustainable emission-to-bribe efficiency level, ideally below **$1.25 emission per $1 bribe.**

• This ensures external protocols remain incentivized to bribe (as rewards exceed bribes), while limiting the protocol’s value extraction and reducing inflation.

**Benefits to Curve DAO and the Ecosystem:**

• The Inflation Reducer veFunder will **capture excess rewards** , effectively reducing inflation as these rewards are funneled back to the DAO rather than external protocols.

• The DAO will accumulate more CRV, which can be used for future initiatives such as **crvUSD incentives** or strategic liquidity expansions.

**Impact on Liquid Lockers and Market Dynamics:**

• The mechanism provides stabilization during upward price movements:

• Liquid lockers will likely maintain a more **stable peg** since the Inflation Reducer ensures that a price surge leads to proportionally higher APYs.

• This reduces long-term significant depegging risks and ensures consistent alignment between price action and protocol rewards.

**Expected Outcomes:**

• **Efficient Emissions:** Reduces inefficiencies in CRV emissions and aligns incentives for both the DAO and external participants.

• **Reduced Inflation:** Captures value internally, slowing inflation and building a robust DAO treasury.

• **Market Stability:** Helps stabilize liquid lockers and maintain efficient market behavior during volatile price movements.

This proposal ensures Curve DAO retains a more efficient control over emissions while continuing to incentivize external participation, fostering a balanced and sustainable ecosystem.

**Alternative Solutions:**  
The proposed approach is just one of many potential methods to address and capture excess inflationary CRV rewards. The primary goal is to initiate a discussion and gauge support for strategies aimed at mitigating excessive inflation. I encourage others to share additional ideas or alternative solutions that could effectively manage and capture these excess rewards.

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**Author:** ![0xSEM](http://gov.curve.finance/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/0/9de053/32.png) [@0xSEM](http://gov.curve.finance/u/0xSEM)\
**Post date:** [December 7, 2024, 6:14pm UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/crv-emission-efficiency-optimization/10393/2 "2024-12-07T18:14:54Z")

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As mentioned by mo, instead of deploying a LP with gauge, this can also simply be achieved using a veFunder gauge, adjusted above post accordingly

> **[mo in Curve Finance](https://t.me/curvefi/677692)**
>
> btw no need to create a LP at all. one could just create a veFunder gauge instead.
