# Contribution Progress Update, January-June 2026

**URL:** <http://gov.curve.finance/t/contribution-progress-update-january-june-2026/11114>\
**Category:** Grants\
**Created:** [July 17, 2026, 12:30am UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/contribution-progress-update-january-june-2026/11114 "2026-07-17T00:30:27Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![phil\_00Llama](http://gov.curve.finance/user_avatar/gov.curve.finance/phil_00llama/32/2339_2.png) [@phil\_00Llama](http://gov.curve.finance/u/phil_00Llama)\
**Post date:** [July 17, 2026, 12:30am UTC](http://gov.curve.finance/t/contribution-progress-update-january-june-2026/11114/1 "2026-07-17T00:30:27Z")

</div>

## Summary

This report covers H1 of 2026. The two main events that got my attention were the crvUSD situation on February 6th, that had borrow rates spike to 300%,

 ![Weighted Borrow Rate: 287.20%](http://gov.curve.finance/uploads/default/original/2X/2/2e8dcb77868242c0926e120972c133373aae9997.png)  
and 2nd the announcement of the departure of LlamaRisk, which required recalibrations.

### Overview

#### EMA smoothing on crvUSD rate

The crvUSD-mint rate was too volatile. Following my research that showed how and where to apply a rate-stabilisation, ema-smoothing was applied.

> [@Investigation of EMA Smoothing Debt Fraction on the crvUSD Monetary Policy](https://gov.curve.finance/t/investigation-of-ema-smoothing-debt-fraction-on-the-crvusd-monetary-policy/10968):
>
> Summary Recent governance actions, primarily the increased exposure of crvUSD to YieldBasis, have materially changed the crvUSD system: PegKeeper capacity has expanded, mint-market supply dynamics have shifted, and rate volatility has increased as a by-product of more active peg defense. This proposal evaluates a strategy for reducing rate volatility when minting crvUSD. This involves smoothing the PegKeeper debt fraction portion of the Monetary Policy calculation using an exponential moving av…

#### Increase max scrvUSD share to 80% as emergency response

Spiked borrow rates on crvUSD asked for emergency measures. During this time, the max revshare of 50% had to be increased to avoid flight.

> [@Increase max revshare of crvUSD revenue to scrvUSD from 50% to 80%.](https://gov.curve.finance/t/increase-max-revshare-of-crvusd-revenue-to-scrvusd-from-50-to-80/10989):
>
> Summary: Increase max revshare of crvUSD revenue to scrvUSD from 50% to 80%. Abstract: The FeeSplitter divides crvUSD revenue from mint markets between the scrvUSD staking vault and the DAO. This is currently set at 50/50. This vote increases the max revshare to scrvUSD to 80%. Note there is a dynamic component to this so scrvUSD will only receive 80% of the revenue when the proportion of crvUSD staked in scrvUSD to total circulating supply (mint markets + pegkeepers, but NOT yieldbasis or…

#### Further crvUSD rate adjustments to ease rates on minters

The crvUSD monetary policy needed further tweaking to allow for lower rates for crvUSD minting, practically to incentivise organic demand further down the road.

> [@Adjust crvUSD Monetary Policy Parameters: rate0, sigma, targetFraction](https://gov.curve.finance/t/adjust-crvusd-monetary-policy-parameters-rate0-sigma-targetfraction/11022):
>
> Summary This proposal recommends updating the crvUSD monetary policy parameters as follows: rate0: from ~11.5% to 5% APR sigma: from 0.019 to 0.008 target\_debt\_fraction: from .26 to 1.0 (max allowable value) Raw parameter values: rate0 = 1585489599 sigma = 8000000000000000 target\_debt\_fraction = 1000000000000000000 The objective is to reduce borrow-rate pressure on existing users while maintaining sufficiently restrictive conditions to avoid encouraging substantial new borrowing before crv…

#### Reduce max scrvUSD share back to 50%

With the creation of the eDAO, and improvements to the crvUSD monetary policy, the maximum revenue share could get relaxed back to its previous 50% level.

> [@Decrease max rev share of crvUSD revenue to scrvUSD from 80% to 50%](https://gov.curve.finance/t/decrease-max-rev-share-of-crvusd-revenue-to-scrvusd-from-80-to-50/11042):
>
> Summary: Decrease max rev share of crvUSD revenue to scrvUSD from 80% to 50%. Abstract: The FeeSplitter divides crvUSD revenue from mint markets between the scrvUSD staking vault and the DAO. This is currently set at 80/20, after additional Peg defense measures [introduced in prior votes](https://gov.curve.finance/t/increase-max-revshare-of-crvusd-revenue-to-scrvusd-from-50-to-80/10989). This vote reverts the max revshare to scrvUSD to 50%. Note there is a dynamic component to this so scrvUSD will only receive 50% of the revenue when the proportion of crvUSD staked in scrvUSD to total circ…

#### TricryptoUSDT parameter-update

Since the parameter update for TricryptoUSDT, the adminFee$ was increased by $368 per day on average ($135k annualised). More research on tricryptos is being done, and more proposals will follow, with further enhancements to the pools.

> [@TricryptoUSDT update](https://gov.curve.finance/t/tricryptousdt-update/11084):
>
> Summary: Vote to change parameters of the TricryptoUSDT Pool at 0xf5f5B97624542D72A9E06f04804Bf81baA15e2B4. Newly run simulations show big potential to improve the pool for both the Curve DAO + LP. Abstract: TricryptoUSDT has 7 parameters that can be tweaked: A: 540,000 ► 1,512,000 (2.8x) gamma: 80,500,000,000,000 ► 507,150,000,000,000 (6.3x) mid\_fee: 1,000,000 ► 22,000,000 (22x) out\_fee: 140,000,000 ► 296,800,000 (2.12x) fee\_gamma: 400,000,000,000,000 ► 72,000,000,000,000 (0.18x) a…

#### LlamaLend v2 admin fee correction

Quick patch of misconfigured admin fee % to 10% for LlamaLend v2

> [@LlamaLend V2: Increase admin fees for markets on Optimism 1% -\> 10%](https://gov.curve.finance/t/llamalend-v2-increase-admin-fees-for-markets-on-optimism-1-10/11102):
>
> Summary Increase the LlamaLend V2 market admin fees on Optimism from 1% to 10%. Abstract After an initial period of market bootstrapping and testing, the new LlamaLend V2 markets on Optimism appear to be functioning as intended. This proposal seeks to increase the admin fee from the temporary 1% launch value to 10%, bringing the markets in line with common industry practice while having only a minimal impact on supplier yields. Motivation When the three new LlamaLend V2 markets were activated …

### Housekeeping

#### Curve Map

To create a clear birds view on the dependency tree of Curve, I created an interactive map:

 ![Curve Map](http://gov.curve.finance/uploads/default/original/2X/c/ce465f123460b161d7bb12a980745ded5e291a83.jpeg)

It allows highlighting, eg. selecting crvUSD shows the dependency tree for crvUSD:

 ![Curve Map | crvUSD selected](http://gov.curve.finance/uploads/default/original/2X/2/2958ad00d73332d014f7b9a9ce6a0bd7b2a3fa09.jpeg)

[Link to GitHub](https://phil-svg.github.io/curve-analytics/)

#### Gauges

Further, I began checking in on gauge efficiencies:

 ![emissions vs revenue](http://gov.curve.finance/uploads/default/original/2X/d/d10baa927f9521c6f0a25327b39359f243f56349.png)

[Interactive html](https://phil-svg.github.io/curve-analytics/emissions-vs-revenue.html)

#### Telegram-Bots

Backend refactoring was required after silent breaking changes on the RPC provider side, database latency was also greatly improved. The bots are reporting in real time on Governance Votes, LlamaLend activity, Pool activities, Sandwiches, crvUSD actions, scrvUSD deposits and withdrawals, Pegkeeper movements, … [Telegram: View @curve\_monitor\_backup](http://t.me/curve_monitor_backup)

### H2 preview

#### TricryptoUSDC/T and Tricrypto2

In the pipe are pools enhancements for TricryptoUSDC/T and tricrypto2, which are currently getting refined.

#### Gauges

Advising the DAO in a detailed, clear way about the best way to utilise Gauges caught my attention. Gauges play a significant role in shaping TVL, and their conversion to adminFee$ is far from even.

#### Oracle design

Oracle design will continue to be relevant, I need to test some ideas that could make the design be both simpler and stronger.

#### scrvUSD + yieldbasis

I have also planned for H2 to rethink the scrvUSD mechanics in relation to yieldbasis, with the goal to enable smooth scaling of yieldbasis in such a way that crvUSD borrowers are only mildly affected by BTC price-swings, and perhaps unlocking a better revenue-share to the DAO regarding scrvUSD.

#### Risk

LlamaRisk dropping out caught me off-guard, hence the gauge map and curve maps, as a reaction to stay above water vision-wise.  
Until a new Risk team is officially in place, the essential parts of the (Llama-)Risk work are currently distributed, in form of additional work and responsibilities, among Curve DAO contributors.

– Feedback always welcomed 🦙🦙🦙 –
